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PREFACE

This study is an analysis of the emergence of the FrenchCanadian separatist movement.

It is an examination of the causes

and consequences of social change that contributed to the conditions
of social unrest.

The interactional processes (collective processes)

are used to explain the development of the movement out of a state
of social unrest and discontent.

The scope of this study includes

an analysis of the events in French-Canada* s history that were
significant in the emergence of the separatist movement.

The important

aspects of French-Canadian culture and social structure are examined
to provide an understanding of the nature of the existing social
conditions•
Descriptive research is employed to interpret and analyze
French-Canadian history, sociological studies of the French-Canadian
society, news reports of significant events, and Canadian government
documents and reports.

The interpretation of these sources of data

is explained in the sociological frame of reference for the study of
collective behavior and social movements presented by Lang and Lang
in their book, Collective Dynamics (1961).
In planning for this study, the intent was to rely heavily
on primary sources of data, such as interviews, letters, and reports
from English and French-Canadian contacts.
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Due to my inability to

make the necessary visits to Canada required to accumulate sufficient
data and the unexpected out-of-country employment of ray personal
contacts, in Canada, secondary sources "became the main source of
data for this study.

However, not all was lost, since previous

visits to Canada (Montreal and Toronto) and frequent contact with a
Canadian medical team on duty in Vietnam during my tour there in
1971 and 1972 provided a perspective from which to appreciate the
biases of both the English and French-*’Canadians.

Source material

was selected on the basis of its objectivity and availability.
Special care was taken in selecting books on French-Canadian history.
For example, Mason Wade*s French Canadians 1760-1967 (1968), was
selected as a basic source for supplying French-Canadian historical
data.

Wade, not being a Canadian, is less likely to be biased in

his interpretation of historical facts about the French-Canadians.
Also, both English and French-Canadian historians and authors
reporting research and studies about French-Canada and Canada in
general have referred Wade as a reliable source.

Wade *s history of

the French-Canadians presents the history of both societies (English
j

and French) to the extent that the histories are distinct.

Other

studies and reports are accepted on the author*s/researcher's reputa
tion.

Most of the important news reports and stories were usually

confirmed by reports of the same event by other news sources.

For

example. Time (October 1970) magazine and Newsweek (October 1970)
reported details about the LaPorte and Cross kidnappings without
any variation in facts.

The Report of the Royal Commission on

Bilingualism and Biculturalism. an official publication of the
iv

Canadian government, is accepted at face value as being an objective
and reliable document (most of its statistical reports were obtained
from census infoftnation)*
The primary concern in this study is to analyze the emergence
of the French-Canadian separatist movement through the exposure of
issues, causes, conditions, and social forces that are related to
separatism and the French-Canadian society*

And no intentional

subjective statements are made in any description or analysis of
events and conditions concerning the separatist issues in Canada*
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CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Introduction

The study of social movements is usually regarded as part of
the subject matter of collective behavior and as an aspect of social
change*

The collective behavior approach emphasizes the interactional

processes in the emergence of social movements*

The aspect of social

change emphasizes causes and consequences of social movements in the
changing social order within which they arise.
The framework for the study of social movements articulated
by the Langs (1961) in their book, Collective Dynamics, emphasizes
a "collective behavior" approach.

However, the importance of social

change in relation to social movements is not denigrated by their
j

emphasis on collective behavior*

The Langs strongly underscore the

relationship of collective behavior to ultimate change in the larger
social order.

The social action identified with a social movement

is continuous and directed toward pervasive changes in the social
order.
On the other hand, Gusfield (I970i 7)$ in outlining the
categories in his approach to the study of social movements, discounts
elementary collective behavior as a viable concept for examining
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social movements within the context of social conflict and social
change.

Gusfield's approach stresses the analysis of change and

social conflict.

He views social movements as structured collective

action demanding changes in the system or the social order.

The rela

tionship of collective behavior to social movements is recognized,
but he gives more importance, to the organized aspects of social
movements.

Gusfield uses several examples of elementary collective

behavior to highlight the weakness in this concept to explain change
and social conflict.'*
A crowd at a baseball game may riot, as sports audiences
have been known to do when enraged at a decision. The
outbreak of fire may create panic in a public building.
An audience at a theater is analyzable as a sporadic and
highly suggestible group. Such behavior, however, has
little significance for the system of rules and relation
ships we call social orders. None of these contributes
to an understanding of conflicts and changes in society
(Gusfield, 19?0i 7).
Indeed, this behavior, as presented, has little significance for
the social order, nor.does it contribute to an understanding of
conflicts and changes in society.

These events are isolated, they

are not related to a "spirit" for change, and there are no deep and
vital social causes at issue.
significant.

However, events like these could be

The significance of collective behavior to the study

of social movements becomes obvious when "real" issues are used in
Gusfield*s brief scenarios of elementary collective behavior.

Events

p

from the French-Canadian separatist movement are used in the following
examples*
A crowd at a hockey game riots when a French-Canadian
hockey hero is suspended by the hockey league's president,
an English-Canadlan. Panic is created as a result of

terrorist bomb threats* A French-Canadian audience viewing the
film, Les Ordes (a "fictional documentary” on the experiences of
French-Canadians arrested and detained under the 1970 War
Measures Act), would be a more suggestible group than they
would be if they were viewing Blanche Neige et Les Sent Nalns
(Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs).
These events contribute to a better understanding of
collective behavior, social movements, and social change when the
question, "Why the event occurred?” as well as, "What event Occurred?”
is asked.

The form of behavior has little if any significance for

change or the social order until it is connected to a socially
shared cause vital to society. .
The analysis of the French-Canadian separatist movement in
this paper is done within the framework of elementary collective
behavior and through examining the causes and consequences of social
change in relation to the separatist movement.

The Nature of Social Movements

When the organizational aspect of social movements is
stressed, there is a tendency to mix social movements and voluntary
associations.

From an organizational aspect, a social movement lies

somewhere between the associations and mass behavior.

The associa

tions, such as political parties, or pressure groups, are character
ized by an organizational structure, clear boundaries and stable
functions.

Mass behavior, on the other hand, is an example of purely

elementary collective behavior and lacks all organization (Lang and
Lang, I96I 1 493). Another important difference between social move
ments and the associations is the high degree of spontaneity and

contagion associated with social movements.
When the unstructured aspects of social movements are
stressed, the tendency to view them on the same level of organization
as other forms of elementary collective behavior— the mass, the crowd,
and the public— must be avoided.

The importance of these elementary

forms of collective behavior is the crucial part they play in the
emergence and early formation of social movements.

The excitement,

unity, and energy of a crowd may provide the necessary situation and
conditions to ignite a movement.

Also, the tactics and strategy of

a movement could stimulate the formation of crowds.

The public*s

lack of resolving an issue may be the necessary ingredient to
sufficiently polarize an issue to cause one side to develop its
issues into objectives of a movement.
Social movements are in pursuit of an objective that has a
significant impact on the social order.
society is involved in the movement.

A sizeable portion of the

The pursuit of an objective

that affects and shapes the social order is a demand for change.
According to Marcel Chaput, a devout separatist and author of the
book, Pourauoi Je Suis Separatist, the French-Canadians have been
"battling for crumbs” for the past two hundred years.

They are no

longer satisfied with bilingual and bicultural tokenism from Ottawa.
The French-Canadian separatist is in pursuit of an independent
"state of Quebec.”
The Langs (I96I 1 490) define a social movement as
••elarge-scale, wide spread, and continuing, elementary
collective action in pursuit of an objective that affects
and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect.
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Elementary collective action, as used by the Langs, emphasizes
the unstructured and spontaneously generated forms of collective
action.

Elementary collective action differs from conventional

behavior in that it is primarily based on spontaneity and contagion
rather than on traditional forms of behavior.

Collective action is

unstructured in the sense that it is a departure from institutionalized
forms of behavior.

Yet, in some respects, it is organized to the

degree that it refers to a collectivity in pursuit of a socially
shared objective.
Finally, before discussing the essence of collective
behavior, two important features of the Langs' concept dealing with
collective behavior and social movements in general need mentioning.
Social movements involve people who are active and not passive
responders to trends or tendencies of the social system.
•••the substance of collective dynamics and mass behavior
consists of those patterns of social action that are spon
taneous and unstructured and therefore not reducible to a
social structure. These collective patterns, since they
emerge out of a more elementary kind of social interaction,
cannot be fully explained on the basis of status and roles
participants occupy within a given social setting (Lang and
Lang, 1961* IX-12).
The other point that needs re-emphasizing is that behavior which
brings about social movements is collective and spontaneous and
focused on bringing about changes in the social order.

Collective Processes

Social movements do not just happen.
social unrest.

They emerge out of

Social unrest is best explained by the processes

of collective behavior.

The ultimate purpose of the study of

collective behavior is to discern some of the ways social .movements
and social institutions become organized and come into existence*
The Langs (196I 1 ^2^-44) identify five basic processes, "collective
processes," by which behavior is collectively transformed*
a.

"Collective definition is the process by which cognitive

assessments are brought in line with one another so that some common
and plausible assessment emerges*"

When individuals encounter new

situations and events not covered by traditional norms, a definition
of the situation is arrived at and followed by a collective response#
The least structured way of arriving at some common definition is
by rumor.

Rumor leads to collective action when conventional

behavior does not accomplish goals*

Rumor serves two functions in

the collective definition process*

(l) it attempts to rationalize

or make sense out of the situation? (2) it disrupts the traditional
definition*

Within a social movement, collective definitions may

emerge as changing perspectives that serve to refocus the direction
and objectives of the movement#
b#

"Demoralization is when one's routine expectations and

one's trust in official sources of information have been partially
undermined#

All kinds of breakdowns in norms are viewed as indica

tive of demoralization, since norms and. standards of behavior no
longer serve as points of orientation."

Panic represents the behavior

typical of this situation#
c*

Collective defense#

more, anxieties are aroused.

"During periods of stress, further

When these find a common focus and are

acted out in behavior that does not threaten the unity of the group,
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one can speak of a process of collective defense*”

The "crowd"

offers a refuge for those overcome with stress and anxiety*

Also,

on a larger level, a mass movement can arise out of an alienated
mass and is essentially a matter of collective defense against
demoralization (lang and Lang, 19&Li 3^3)*

d*

"Mass conversion-is the unexpected change of fundamental

values under group influence.”
e*

“Crystallization designates the process by which aliena

tion from the social order finds expression in an elementary form of
organization*”

If, for the purpose of illustrating, the direction of

"disorganization” is down and "organization" is up, then, within the
collective processes, crystallization would be the first indication
of an upward motion— and probably the first indication of a movement*
Social movements emerge out of social unrest when discontent, hope,
and goals crystallize into a collective response to a promise to
cure social ills.

The collective processes do not propose a "stage model" of
collective behavior; the sequence of these processes is situation
f

dependent.

In addition to explaining the emergence of social move

ments, these processes explain why people join and leave on-going
movements*

They help to explain the influence of such phenomena as

communications, fashions, and public opinion on a mass society*

Social Unrest
Restlessness
The condition within the social order necessary for the

emergence of elementary collective behavior occurs when the balance
between disruptive and re-integrative tendencies is especially pre
carious (Lang and Lang* I96I 1 ^2-^3)•

This condition exists within

the social order when there is no prescribed behavior within the
inventory of traditional behavior patterns to deal with new situations.
An encounter with a new situation requires an assessment to be made
based on past experiences, current perceptions, and on some notion
or idea of how the new situation is visualized to conclude.
Encounters with new situations and the conditions that foster
new situations create a general restlessness (it's circular, conditions
create situations and new situations reinforce the conditions).

Rest

lessness is expressed in the form of mass excitement (individual
behavior), and manifests itself in anxiety, fear, and alienation.

It

is random, erratic, and in severe forms, it may be characteristic of
neurotic behavior, and, as such, it has a tendency to alienate others
rather than generate collective response to the stimulus causing the
restlessness.

In order for restlessness to develop into a higher form

of behavior or become collective, it must become shared through a
form of social interaction.

According to Blumer (1972* 73)» "One may

view social unrest as the socialization of restlessness."

Contagion
The Langs (196I 1 209) use three concepts of contagion to
explain the transformation of restlessness into social unrest.
These psychological concepts-^lmiiation, circular reaction, and
suggestibility— are used to explain why individuals tend to act,
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think, or feel as they observe others acting, thinking, or feeling*
Imitation takes into account an individual's perception
of role models, learned behavior, and the meanings attached to a
particular situation to explain why the individual copies a particular
form of behavior.
Circular reaction refers to a type of "symbolic communication"
wherein people respond to the meanings of vocal gestures, movements,
or acts.
To the extent that A is aware what B's action means— that is,
he can "read" B's intentions— A reacts to the significance
that this action has both for B's future conduct and for his
own in relation to B. But if B now takes into account the
significance A will read into B's act, and if this signifi
cance is the same for both, the meaning of the act is shared
by both. By virtue of this, the act becomes a significant
symbol, and from now on the behavior of both A and B is
oriented to this shared meaning. (Lang and Lang I96I 1 215)*
Herbert Blumer regards circular reaction as the most important
mechanism of elementary collective behavior.
...it gives rise to collective, or shared behavior, which is
not based on the adherence to common understandings or rules.
It is for this reason that circular reaction is the natural
mechanism of elementary collective behavior (Blumer, 1972 1
71).
The concept of suggestibility places the leader in the active
and dominant role.
for the participant.

In this case the leader defines the situation
This is a one-way operation whereby the suscep

tible participant responds to the suggestions of the leader.
These mechanisms of contagion supplement each other and are
interrelated with the operation of the collective processes.

Con

tagion is the mechanism that makes spontaneous behavior collective
behavior.

The collective processes describe the ways in which
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forms of social unrest express themselves.

Conditions of Social Unrest
All social unrest does not necessarily lead to large scale
or visible collective responses; it may just dissipate without any
consequences.

However, social unrest is an incipient preparation

for social movements.

It plays two important functions in preparing

society for changei
a.

It disrupts any equilibrium or balance within the social

structure by breaking down traditional behavior patterns through the
modification of institutional patterns.
b.

Social unrest prepares individuals and groups for

changed definitions of the situation.
A movement arises when, .the general situation is favorable,
and at the same time it gets its impetus from some specific person
or event (Lang and Lang, I96I 1 51?)•
situation for the rise of a movement.

Social unrest is a favorable
The conditions of social

unrest which favor social movements are many.

Some of the more

significant ones are introduced here.
Societies undergoing rapid social change and societies in a
state of transition are always to some extent disorganized and thus,
more susceptible to social movements than the stable societies.

In

a disorganized society traditions no longer serve as a dependable
guide to behavior.

In a disorganized society, Individuals tend to

become alienated, frustrated, and confused.

According to Hoffer

(1951* 20) frustration and confusion, rather than poverty and misery,
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give rise to social movements.
Perceived relative deprivation is a concept which depicts
the frustrations people experience when they are not receiving the
things in life to which they feel they are justifiably entitled.
Gurr (19681 52) points out that
Relative deprivation is a state of mind that can be defined
as a discrepancy between peopled (value) expectations about
the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably
entitled» on the one hand* and on the other their value
capabilities - what they perceive to be their chances for
getting and keeping those goods and conditions.
It is important to note that relative deprivation is primarily in
the eye of the beholder; if one does not perceive that he is relatively
deprived! even if in fact he is relatively deprived, he normally does
not represent a source of discontent.
Economic, political, and social injustices (real, or perceived)
provide fertile grounds for social unrest.

When any or all of these ,

conditions conflict with the "deprived*s” image of social justice,
a condition emerges whereby discontent reinforces discontent.

A

strong current in the French-Canadian Separatist ideology is the
tenet that Quebec is a conquered nation, and only by a free "state
of Quebec” will the French-Canadians break the ties of EnglishCanadian colonialism.

Economic statistics show that the French-

Canadians earn less than do the English-Canadians, and that the FrenchCanadians are generally blocked out of executive positions in big
business organizations.

Although the French language is the official

language of Quebec, knowledge of the English language is a necessity
when dealing with government and business organizations.

The French-

Canadian* s self-image (as a conquered nation) is reinforced each

12
time he encounters a discriminatory situation.

In turn, his percep

tions of social justice and self-image make the situation or condition
more real than what really exists•

Prerequisites
In addition to the fundamental prerequisite of a 'vulnerable
population, with all the processes and mechanisms that operate to
bring about social unrest, other variables need to be recognized to
explain the emergence and consequences of social movements.

Organization and Strategy
The organization and strategy of a movement changes as the
movement progresses through the various phases.

In the earliest stage

it comprises a core group crystallized out of elementary collective
action.

As the movement passes from phase to phase the organization

and strategy will take on the characteristics of the leadership,
ideology, and objectives (goals).

The Langs (I96I 1 531) list

several structural problems that must be solved if the movement is to
survive *
1. Regularizing the relations between leaders and followers.
2. Developing an appropriate type of leadership.
3* Determining the hierarchy of leaders and functionaries.
4. Organizing of a staff.
5. Co-ordinating the relations among various groups within
the movement.

Leadership
Leadership Is a necessary prerequisite for a social movement.
It acts as a catalyst in the crystallization of a movement.

According
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to Hoffer (1951* 10*0 leadership is an indispensable unifying agent
in a movement; "without him (a leader) there will be no movement*M
On the other hand, the leader is helpless until the conditions for a
movement are right.

"No matter how vital we think the role of

leadership in the rise of a mass movement, there is no doubt that
the leader cannot create the conditions which make the rise of a
movement possible” (Hoffer, 1951* 103)*
Leaders play an important role as unifiers.

They are agents

of contagion during the milling stage, the incipient stage, of a
movement.

They serve as examples for the discontented to imitate.

Because they are recognized as leaders, they are able to define
situations, define social ills, and implant a spirit of hope -in the
participants.

A major task of leadership, regardless of the stage

the movement is in, is to focus generalized social unrest toward the
movement *s objectives•
Ideology
The ideology of a movement reflects the unique character of
the movement.'

Ideology justifies actions, reinforces beliefs, and

perpetuates the cause.

It provides guidance and direction for the

leaders, followers, and participants.

Ideology is conducive to the

formation of collective definitions that support the movement and
enhance unity within the movement.
Rallying Points
There are other factors in the category of social objects
and unifying agents that determine the viability of a movement.

A movement does not have to emanate from a social object to be
influenced by it.

However, a movement needs something at which to

"point its finger."

A villain serves to move the collectivity into

action, "Mass movements can rise and spread without a belief in a
God but never without a belief in a devil" (Hoffer, 1951* 86).

On

the other hand, a social object may be a source of inspiration (in
the form of an idol rather than through the organizational structure
leadership).

De Gaulle served the French-Canadians in this capacity

External events that serve as rallying points for the movement are
unifying agents.

The idea that the French-Canadians are victims of

colonalism was drawn from the African independence movements.

CHAPTER II

• SOCIAL AND HISTORIC BASES OF FRENCH-CANADIAN
NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM
Introduction
To understand French-Canadian separatism in the light of
French-Canadian nationalism and Canada in general, the social history
of French-Canada must be examined in more detail#

The purpose of

this chapter is not to recount a history but to highlight the signi
ficant social conditions and historic events in French-Canadian
history which fostered and perpetuated the nationalism and social,
unrest that eventually gave rise to the French-Canadian separatism
movement#
French-Canadian nationalism was b o m when the British first
attempted to assimilate the French into the Anglo-Saxon culture.
This national.ism became stronger through the influence of the Roman
Catholic Church.

The interrelationship of the Church and the educa

tional system strengthened nationalism# but failed to prepare FrenchCanada (Quebec) for the consequences and forces of industrialization
and urbanization.

For the most part, French-Canadian separatism

remained submerged in the nationalist movement until the early 1960's#
Separatism emerged only on a few occasions prior to post World War II.
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Nationalism and separatism are not synonymous.

French-

Canadian nationalism, as a social movement, has general and non
specific goals and objectives.
the French way of life.

Its primary objective is to maintain

The French-Canadian nationalists use the

term, "la survivance" (ethnic survival) to express their feelings of
nationalism.

The French-Canadian separatist movement has the same

general objective, but more specifically, its goal is to be able to
maintain the French way of life by controlling all French-Canadian
social institutions (especially the economic institution over which
the French-Canadians have the least control).

According to the

separatists, this can be accomplished only when Quebec obtains
complete sovereignty.

Thus, the French-Canadian separatists use

the term, "l'epanouissement" (emancipation), to express the nature
of their goal.

The British Conquest

The British defeated the French on the Plains of Abraham
(near Quebec City)
an September 13* 1759*
;
■

Four years later France

ceded New France (what now is Canada) to Britain.

This event had

psychological significance as well as social and historic implications
for the future relations of

French and English— Canadians • The

separatists would have it that the separatist movement was born the
day after the British defeated the French (Corbett, 196?* 27)•
They draw on this evenf to support their self-definition as a con
quered nation.

The popular phrase "Je me souviens" is used by the

French-Canadians to remind them of the days of New France, and to
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serve as a constant reminder that the French-Canadians are a conquered
people (Wade, 1955* **?)•

French-Canadian historians, especially

those with strong separatist feelings, take great care to emphasize
in their history their minority status under British rule*

Abbe

Lionel Grouix, a French-Ganadian historian, and a source of nation
alist ideology after the turn of the century, made famous the phrase
"Notre maitre, le passe" ("Our master, the past") and established it
as a principle for action in the present (Wade, 1955* l)*
Following the

British conquest, there was an unsuccessful

attempt by the British to assimilate and "protestantize" the French
(Clark, 1965* 16).

Most of the French administrators and officials

had returned to France when New France became a British colony.
According to Clark (1965* 1?) the remaining French population con
sisted of peasants, small merchants, some seigneurs, and a total of
one hundred and sixty-four parish priests and monks.

Thus without

its political leadership, and all ties with France broken, the FrenchCanadian population stood alone to defend its way of life against
assimilation by the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture.

An important conse

quence of this situation was the emergence of the

Roman Catholic

Church as the defender of the. French-Canadian *s right to maintain his
identity with French culture, to speak the French language, to practice
the Roman Catholic religion, and to keep his own customs and privileges.
The early British governors of the French colony were very lenient
toward the French and won the support of the Church (Armstrong, 19^7*
^).

The promise not to protestantize the French was made official by

the Quebec Act of 177^*

This act gave the French-Canadians free
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exercise of religion and retention of French law.

This act also

served to reinforce the Church's support for the British government
and prevented the French-Canadians from joining the American Colonies
in the revolution against England (Armstrong, 1937* 5-6) •

The Church and the Educational System
The Catholic Church played a significant role in the evolution
of the French-Canadian society.

The parish, a territorial unit of

the Catholic Church, replaced the seigniorial estates in rural French
Canada and became the significant unit of social organization
(Falardeau, 19**9*.528-529.) •

"The spiritual leader of the community,

the cure, took over many responsibilities of municipal leadership and
became the secular as well as the religious leader of the local group
committed to his care" (Falerdeau, 19^9)*

The urban parish does not

exercise this degree of control over the lives and activities of its
members.

However, the urban parishes provide a means of controlling

and directing discontent and frustrations within the Church organiza
tion through various movements and professional associations called
"Catholic action" movements (Falardeau, 19^9* 353~36?)• The Church
maintained its influence over the French-Canadian population and
supported the Canadian government until the. late 1950*s'.and early

1960's when its control was weakened by urbanization and internal
conflict within the Church, especially between the older and younger
clergy (Wade, 19681 1107-1109).
The influence of the Church was prevalent in the educational
system in French-Canada.

According to Armstrong (193?) * the Quebec

educational system was supervised and staffed by members of the
clergy.

The "Catholic committee" selected teachers and approved the

curriculum for most of the schools in Quebec*
a strong religious flavor*

This gave education

"its object has been to form good men

who shall also be good Catholics," (Armstrong, 1937* ^0)#

Hughes

(19^3* 106-3JA) points out in his study of a French-Canadian community
that the emphasis on training in the classics and professions (doctors,
lawyers, dentists, etc.) in the French-Canadian schools left its
graduates ill-prepared to assume a managerial role in commerce and
industry when industrialization impacted on French-Canada during the
early 19^0*s.

Thus, ownership and management of French-Canadian

industry became dominated by the English-Canadians and the United
States investors.

This situation presented a source of frustration

for the French-Canadian aspiring for "materialistic success" (as
opposed to the idealist nature of his education)•

Initially, strong

nationalist feelings (the French-Canadian*s value system) prevented
the French-Canadian from questioning or accusing his social system
for his inferior position.

Subsequent definitions of this situation,

the French-Canadian*s inferior status in the economic system, served
to alienate the French-Canadian new middle class from traditional
values and established the English-Canadian and United States business
in Quebec as "villains" of the separatist movement.

The Economic Institution

The influence the Church had on other institutions during
the period of the British conquest was a function of the Church*s
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stability and the disorganization experienced by the other institutions
during this period of rapid social change#

The Roman Catholic Church

had a "foothold" in Quebec at the time of the British conquest, and
through its zeal to maintain Catholicism in Quebec its influence
overflowed into the other institutions#
was no exception#

The economic institution

There was never:one dominant economic system

throughout the entire history of New France#

The seigniorial system

in New France was modelled after the land tenure system in France
and was intended to be the foundation of the colony*s economic system#
This system has been described as a failure and, at best, a limited
success (Fregault, 195*0 • The Seigniorial system, as an economic
base, could not withstand the competition from the lucrative fur
trade business, and failed as a means of social integration when the
Church assumed that function.
Before the British conquest the French-Canadians lacked a
viable entrepreneurial class (Corbett, 1967* 15) • After the conquest,
French industry suffered when the merchants who remained after the
British conquest lost their trade connections with Paris and the rest
t

of Europe.

This, coupled with the influx of British merchants to

Canada with the invading British Army, gave the English-Canadians an
overwhelming edge in the economic arena.

Eventually, the fur trade

business, the most lucrative commercial enterprise in Canada at the
time, was taken over from the French by the British.

According to

Corbett (1967* 16) within a few years after the conquest the EnglishCanadians dominated industry in Canada and the French-Canadians
became farmers.
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Early Expressions of Separatism

The French-Canadian social system that evolved from the
changes associated with the British conquest prepared the French-*
Canadian to define situations in terms of their threat to his culture.
The English-Canadian and British were natural targets when the FrenchCanadian became faced with these situations.
The first indication of French-Canadian separatism was the
Riel Rebellion.

Riel, a French-Canadian half-breed, led the Metis

Indians in a protest movement against Canadian domination and
annexation of the new territories.

The French-Canadians regarded

Riel as a patriot who sought to protect the rights of a French
Catholic population and who was now being punished by the EnglishCanadians because of his religion and ethnic heritage.
sentenced to hang by an English-Canadian judge in 1885.

Riel was
His execution,

more than any other event, proved to the French-Canadians that Canada*s
responsibility was to the English Majority first (Corbett, 1967* 28).
The first significant separatist activity, the World War I
conscription crisis, was inspired by the bilingual school issue in
\

Ontario, a totally unrelated issue.

The school question centered

around an Ontario Department of Education regulation which limited
the use of French as the language of
schools (Armstrong, 1937* 90-99) •

instruction in French-English

The French-Canadians in Ontario

and in Quebec (the self-appointed protector of all French-Canadians
in Canada) defined this action on the part of the English-Canadians
as a threat to the separate school system.

Prior to the school
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controversy, French-Canadians were supporting the war in Europe
with volunteers for the armed forces (Armstrong, 1937* 89)• To
the French-Canadian nationalist "les anglais'1 were depriving the
French-Canadians in Ontario of a "French” education*

The nationalist

could not reconcile this condition with fighting an "anglais" wax
in Europe*

They became more concerned with a more important cause

at home, one that had to do with defending their culture rather
than defending foreign soil.

As a result the French-Canadians, not

only in Quebec but in the western provinces as well, collectively
opposed conscription and the wax (Armstrong, 1937* 95)•
Henri Bourassa, the owner of the newspaper "Le Devoir"
spread nationalist and anti-conscription sentiments throughout the
French population (Wade, 1955* 75^*7^).

Lionel Groulx initiated the

first teachings of French-Canadian history at the University of
Montreal in 1915 (Wade, 1955* 755)•

His nationalist and separatist

interpretations of Canadian history stressed the differences and
antagonisms between the French-Canadians and the English-Canadians,
and were well received by the French-Canadian youth.
French-Canadian nationalist sentiment reached its peak during
June-August 1917» when violence and rioting became widespread.

Crowds

would march through the streets of Montreal shouting anti-conscription
and separatist slogans, "A bas Borden" ("Down with Borden," the Prime
Minister) and "vive la revolution."

A riot broke out in Quebec City

as the result of a public speech made by a politician to the effect
that, "If conscription law is enforced, Canadians have only one
choice— to die in Europe or to die in Canada.

As fax’as I am
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concerned, if my body is to fall in any land, I want it to be on
Canadian soil” (Wade, 1955* ?**?)•
The events and the school issue building up to the conscrip
tion crisis, as defined by the French-Canadian nationalists, proved
that French-Canadians and their interests were secondary to the
English-Canadians.

If their interests were to be protected, the

French-Canadian would have to take an active lead.

The World War I

conscription crisis was an important factor that contributed to the
later (i960*s) and dynamic emergence of the separatist movement*
1.

The French and English-Canadians became divided on key

issues which remain unresolved.
2.

Nationalist and separatist ideology emerged as a

deliberate program for action.
3*

A precedent for active protest and violence was set

which made the French-Canadian response to World War II conscription
a foregone conclusion.
4.

The conscription crisis demonstrated that the French-

Canadians could
1 unite for a common cause.
When World War II and another bout with conscription came
upon Quebec, the French-Canadians had the benefit of Abbe Groulx's
nationalist ideology.
depression.

Canada had just experienced a great economic

The French-Canadians were beginning to realize their

inferior position in Quebec industry and, therefore, were little
concerned with the problems in Europe and especially another war
(Wade, 1968* 916).

French-Canadian nationalism was kept in check

by traditionalist opponents and by the lack of complete endorsement
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by the Quebec Roman Catholic clergy.

The Prime Minister of Quebec,

Maurice Duplessis, preached a demagogic nationalism but always
deferred to the United States and English-Canadian investors who
controlled Quebec*s industry (Wade, 1968* 1107“1108).

Another counter

to the growth of nationalism and the emergence of separatism is that
Duplessis never challenged the Church's complete control of education
and massive influence on the French-Canadian's life in general.
The conscription issue during the Second World War was not
as violent as the crisis experienced during World War I.

However,

there were minor outbursts against conscription (Wade, 19681 1070-1072).
In 1939 the Canadian Prime Minister stated, "So long as this govern
ment may be in power, no such measure (conscription) will be enacted.”
In April 1942 a plebiscite was held in which the electorate was asked
to release the administration from its past commitments.

For the

■

X

whole country the plebiscite showed 64 per cent of the votes in favor
of releasing the government of its previous commitment.

The Quebec

vote was an overwhelming 80 per cent "No” vote. The French-Canadians
\
felt the government had no right to renege on its promise (Wade,
1968* 916-990).

Once more the French-Canadians found themselves in

opposition to the rest of Canada.
An outgrowth and reaction to the World War II conscription
issue was the formation of the "Bloc Populaire," a movement of
nationalist youth which was organized in 1942 and a forerunner of
the i960 separatist movement (Wade, 1968* 1001).
This then, was the status of

French-Canada as it found

itself caught up in a period of rapid transition and had to dead with

the following*
1#

A merging of urbanization and industrialization*

2.

The role of the Church as the sanctioning institution

of social values*
3*

The traditional national goal, "survivance."

CHAPTER III
SEPARATISM AND THE FRENCH-CANADIAN t
PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTICIPANTS

French-Canadian separatism emeiged as a visible expression
of discontent during a period of rapid social change occurring in
the immediate post-World War II period of Quebec*

This period#

identified b y vmany as the "Quiet Revolution#" marked the beginning of
the current separatist movement.

For the most part# the conditions

and changes taking place in Quebec were not contrived by the FrenchCanadian nationalists, and happened independently of nationalism or
the separatist movement*

According to the Langs (1961i 50?)*

The social movement# while itself a collective enterprise to
effect changes in the social order# is also a response to
changes in social conditions that have occurred independently
of its efforts* Social movements# therefore, are more likely
to arise in a society undergoing rapid social change than in
a stable one*
!

This is precisely the case of the French-Canadian nationalist
movement and the emergence of the separatist movement*

French-

Canadian nationalism did not bring about urbanization and industriali
zation i if anything traditional nationalism was against or neutral to
urbanization*

This was especially true of the Church which stood to

lose to urbanization its control over the rural population and its
influence and status of preserving the French culture*

Industrializa

tion and urbanization created the conditions which forced French
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Canadians to redefine their position in Quebec in relation to that
of the English Canadian*

The complete and sudden change in Quebec's

political leadership was independent of any nationalist undertakings#
but It was a significant factor in mobilizing the French-Canadians
for a separate Quebec.

These conditions and their ramifications

Ignited the separatist desire which was fed and inspired by key
events and the Identification with social objects at critical times
to keep the movement alive*
Changing Conditions and Perspectives
Urbanization
The many social changes that have occurred in Quebec (FrenchCanada) are related to urbanization.

Urbanization accentuated and

caused severe problems of economic inequality expressed in severe
social class differences.

Another significant consequence of

urbanization was the disintegration of traditional social institu
tions, specifically church# family and education.
The French-Canadian, for the most part, was an unskilled
worker in French-Canadian industry* the managers, and owners came
from the English-Canadians and Americans.

The French-Canadlan's

relegation to unskilled work was a function of his education and the
teachings of the Quebec Roman Catholic Church.

Everett Hughes

(1963* 55). in his study of the impact of industry on a French-

Canadian town, found that the managerial staff of a particular textile
mill was exclusively English-Canadian and only twenty-five out of
eighty-two foremen were French-Canadians.

(See Table I).
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For the French-Ganadian to aspire to greater levels in the
industrial hierarchy would require him to give up too much of his
French culture.

A traditional French-Canadian education did not

provide the type of training to support the technical skills required
in industry.

S. D. Clark (1971* 83)# in his study of French-Canadian

industrial communities, identified, in addition to a lack of technical
skills, the French-Canadian's commitment to his ethnic origin and
rel igion as key factors that tied the French-Canadian to his community
and consequently to the unskilled jobs.

The French-Canadian's con

cern over his language, religion, and way of life in general takes
precedence over advancement.

The French Canadian's attempt to maintain

his cultural heritage is evidenced in Hughes' (19^3* 180) description of
how the French-Canadian industrial workers created a self-imposed hard
ship by building "Shanties" outside of town in an effort to maintain
the rural spirit and existence under town, wage-working conditions.
These settlements, in many cases, constituted slum-like conditions
without the conveniences and services of town life.
Once committed to urbanization, family traditions began to
break down.

The family tradition of passing the family property on

to the oldest son became obsolete (Hughes, 19^3* 18^).

The passing

of this tradition served to weaken the family's control over the
individual and the Church's influence over the individual and the
family.
The United States met industrialization with technical
education and organizations, in the form of trade unions, to cope
with the problems of an industrial civilization (Hughes, 19^3* 211).
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Unless mechanisms exist for the adaption and incorporation
into the social order of the demands of dissatisfied groups,
these segments of the population, finding their aspirations
unrecognized, will provide a fertile field for the growth
of sectarian associations (Lang and Lang I96I 1 507)*
The French-Canadians did not have the mechanisms for meeting the
frustrations and anxieties associated with industrialization and
urbanization*

The organization closest to a trade union were the

"Catholic Action" groups sponsored by the Church*

However, the Church

hierarchy was in collusion with the political machine of Duplessis
to further the nationalist cause of "survivance."

As such, the

Church and government supported industry by providing a trouble-free
labor force*
The subordinate position of the French-Canadian worker in
the urban community, the fact that the superior and controlling
positions in industry were occupied by English-Canadians and Americans,
and the slum-like living conditions of the industrial workers provided
the conditions fostering misery and destitute characteristic of a
proletariat social movement*

However, a movement of this type failed

to materialize from the French-Canadian working class*

This lends

?

•.

credence to Eric Hoffer's (1951* 20) postulate that "frustration and
confusion, rather than poverty and misery, give rise to social move
ments*"

Obviously, there were expressions of social, unrest and dis

content against the industrial hierarchy during the 19^0 *s and 1950’s
but not to the extent that they became an organized (workers or
nationalist) movement against "foreign" control of French-Canadian
industry*

What did emerge, however, during the mid and late fifties

was the "new middle class" (Ossenberg, 1971* 103-123)» the vanguard
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of the separatist movement.

Political Conditions and Changes
The new middle class is another consequence of urbanization.
The mass exodus from country to city in response to Industrialization
naturally required additional staffing of urban institutions.
(196*4-1 150-162) calls this the bureaucratic revolution.

Guindon

The new

middle class was the recipient of the Union Rationale's (the encumbent
political party) corruption and oppression.

Thus the Union Nationale

and its leader, Duplessis, became the source of frustration for the
new middle class.
Between 1 9 ^ and 1959t Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis ruled
the province with an iron hand ; his major allies were the Roman
Catholic Church and industry.

Duplessis* regime was marked by con

servatism, Quebec nationalism (not separatism), authoritarianism,
corruption, and the ruthless repression of reform (Clark, 1965* 21-23)*
Under Duplessis, as political scientist Rolf Spencer observed,
French-Canadians - always seeing themselves in the role of
the defeated minority - developed a religious and educational
introversion, a tight, inward-looking, backward order which
emphasized family, land, church, and traditions (196*4-1 283-286).
Hubert Guindon (196*4-* 152-15*4-) made the following comments concerning
the new middle class and Duplessis,
...the economic and status interests of this new middle class
were not being met. Salaries could not be increased. Why?
Because of Duplessis. Staff could not be hired. Why?
Because of Duplessis.
Duplessis became a symbol of oppression, of reactionary government.
The growth of semi-public bureaucratic institutions required
greatly increased and predictable amounts of money from the
provincial treasury. Because he refused to meet these class
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demands, Duplessis was emotionally and unanimously resented by
the new middle class. Where Duplessis failed, Sauve succeeded.
Guindon notes that Duplessis based his political machine on the rural
and lower-urban social strata*

After his death these classes felt

unrepresented, uncared for, with no significant voice in the political
arena*

The Liberal party which replaced the Union Rationale, and its

leader Lesage were unable to gain the support of the lower social
strata.

On the other hand, it was the new middle class who elected

the Liberal party and Lesage to office.

Interviews with members of

both the new middle class and the lower urban strata confirm Guindon*s
comments concerning the French-Canadian*s image of Duplessis (Notes,

*

1972).
The new middle class consisted of the educated, professional
and semi-professional, salaried, white-collar workers.

Their source of

frustrations under the Duplessis regime was basically a lack of recog
nition of job importance by the government.
the scapegoat and the oppressor.

As such, Duplessis was

After his death most of the demands

made by the new middle class for economic and status recognition were
met by the government.

Even with the government's accommodation, the

status of the French-Canadian middle class did not match that of the
English-Canadian civil servant or the Ehglish-Canadian in private
industry.

The new middle class became acutely aware of its relatively

deprived status and set out to do something about it— independence
for French-Canada "etat de Quebec.”

The English Canadians and foreign

Investors and managers of French-Canadian industries replaced
Duplessis as the scapegoat.
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Relative Deprivation
At the beginning of the decade of the I960*s over five
million of Canada’s eighteen million people lived in the province of
Quebec*

Approximately four million Quebeckers* (98 percent of the

province’s population) mother tongue was French; 62 percent of this
group spoke only French (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 196?t Book Ii 15“39)•

Lieberson's research reveals

that in 1961 monolingual English-Canadians income was $5124 compared
to $4385 for the bilingual French-Canadian (l970i 171)*

(Additional

data concerning the effect of education, occupations, and ethnic
origin are found in Tables II and IH)*

Seventy-seven percent of the

jobs in Quebec paying $15,000 a year or higher were held by EnglishCanadians » who comprised only 30 percent of the total work force,
and the average income of an English-Canadian was 40 percent higher
than the provincial average (Newsweek* 19701 43) • The unemployment
rate in Quebec traditionally was higher than elsewhere in Canada*
In one typical year during this period, French-Canadians, who made
up approximately 25 percent of Canada’s work force, accounted for
41 percent of the nation's unemployed*

Nationwide, unemployment

ran at about 7 percent? in Quebec, it stood at 10 percent (Business
Week, 1970 1 36).
The French-Canadians faced a tremendous disadvantage in
industry? the English “Canadians and the Americans controlled Quebec’s
economy (Lieberson, 1970* 83-85)*

Few French-Canadians occupied

positions of importance in large corporations, the federal civil
service, or the armed forces.

For example, only about 11 percent of
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the senior positions in the federal civil service were held by
French-Canadians j in one typical year, of 11?5 high-ranking federal
civil servants, only 135 were French-Canadians (Caloren, 19671 915),
Another survey revealed that of I 63 civil servants receiving salaries
of $14,000 a year or more, only 6 were French-Canadians (Clark,

19651 146).
The French-Canadians in the early I960*s were relatively
deprived and more importantly their daily activities made them aware
that their position was subordinate to the English-Canadian#

Susceptibility of the French-Canadian

Collective Processes
The French-Canadian situation at the beginning of the i9601s
illustrates the operation of the Langs* (1961) "collective processes"
discussed, in Chapter I.

In applying these processes to the Quebec

situation it must be remembered that when dealing with a large scale
operation, a collective response to a given situation may take a
period of time to develop.

Also, there is not a clear cut distinction

when one process stops and another starts since the processes
usually operate simultaneously and tend to work toward and reinforce
the cyrstallizatlon process.
The Church, family, educational, and political institutions
have traditionally been paramount in the life of the French-Canadian.
They served to define their culture and their way of life against
assimilation into the Anglo Saxon culture.

These institutions

provided the definitions for the French-Canadian in assessing events
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and situations.

He depended on the symbols of these institutions*

the cure* (church)» papa* (family)* and "le chef#" Duplessis, (government)
to provide reconcilable solutions and answers to changing conditions
and events*
Demoralization occurred when traditional values and norms
failed to provide for

Prench-Canada's economic interests in the

face of urbanization.

Not only did conventional values and norms fail

to provide the definitions for coping with urbanization, but tradi
tional values, especially preservation of the French language, sub
ordinated the French-Ganadian to the English-Canadian in Quebec.

The

process of demoralization became evident when the lower classes•
response to urbanization is compared to the response of the new
middle class.

The lower class responded by attempting to make urban

life fit into the traditional way of life.

The French industrial worker,

in spite of urbanization, refused to break away completely from the
rural spirit.

The value system of the rural spirit provided the

definitions of urbanization that the lower class worker could live
with.

The lower class supported Duplessis* form of nationalism, even

though it was detrimental to his economic well being, because it wan
defined as supporting the French-Ganadian way of life.

Consequently,

there was very little if any demoralization in the lower strata.

On

the other hand, the new middle class entered the I960*s with its
traditional ties to Church and family strained.

The middle class

was educated in an urbanized environment and their occupations
departed from the traditional French-Canadian professional occupations.
Their work environment was a constant reminder of their subordinate
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position to their English-Canadian counterpart.

The new middle

class could not reconcile traditional nationalism, taught by the
Church and supported by the Union Nationale, especially Duplessis,
with its inferior economic status.

If the Church and state are

supposed to be the protector of French-Canadian culture and way of
life, why have they allowed the Ehglish-Canadian and foreign in
vestors to take over and control Quebec•s industries?

Why do the

French-Canadian schools produce an education that is useless in the
business world?
The new middle class's confrontation with the frustrations
of urbanization naturally required assessments to be made of the
situation.

The sequence of events comprising the new middle class's

response to perceived deprivation— the rejection of Duplessis, then
its spontaneous support of Sauve's form of Union Nationale, and then
its complete shift of allegiance to Lesage and the Liberal partydemonstrates the process of mass conversion and the degree of shared
perspectives in its attempt to cope with frustrations and anxieties.
The middle class's basic definition of the situation remained con
stant, the dynamic shifting was a function of collective defense.
The scapegoating of Duplessis and the English Canadians is. a form of
collective defense.
point for the
tions.

In both cases it served as a common rallying

French Canadians (middle class) to vent their frustra

The middle class entered the decade leading the French-

Canadian separatist movement and left behind the traditions associated
with "survivance" and replaced it with "epanouissement."
The process of crystallization received its impetus from
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key events and through identification with social objects#

This

allowed the specific issue of economic subordination to solidify
into the more sweeping and radical objective of separatism#
Separatist ideology represented a resurgence of French
culture— renewed identity with French-Canadian history, the French
language, and culture— all the traditional values which had before
failed to provide adequate definitions.
directed toward separatism#
two major purposes#

However, they were now

The emphasis on ethnic heritage served

It encouraged shared perspectives to provide

for collective definitions and responses.

It provided the movement

with an idol and a scapegoat#
An idol personifies some general achievementj each society
creates its idols in Its own image (Lang and Lang 1961* 291-331) •
During the early 1960* s President de Gaulle of France had started
his eviction of all NATO armed forces from France.

This to the French-

Canadians was an expression of French independence which coincided
with separatist ideology concerning the colonial status of Quebec#
This and de Gaulle's visits to Quebec made him an obvious idol and
!

■'

-

rallying point in crystallizing the separatist movement (Notes, 1972).
On de Gaulle's visit to Canada in 1967» hls second visit to Canada in
)

''

the decade, he broke diplomatic protocol by spending four days with
the Quebec Premier in Quebec before visiting the Canadian Prime
Minister (New York Times# 1967* July 2*f and 25)*

De Gaulle was given

a hero's welcome in Quebec by the French-Canadian separatists#
was greeted by crowds who carried separatist banners, waved the
French national colors, and shouted "Vive le Quebec libre"

He
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(’’Free Quebec”)•

De Gaulle responded with an appropriate separatist

slogan, ''Vive la Nouvelle France!" (Long live New France!) (New York
Times, 19671 July 27)*

Later, in 1967# de Gaulle called on Canada to

give Quebec the status of a sovereign state#

These events, in

addition to their significance as social objects, gave the FrenchCanadian separatist movement international recognition.

According

to a public opinion poll, published by New York Times (1967» August
24), 45 percent of the French-Canadians disapproved of de Gaulle's
actions and 18 percent approved.
If de Gaulle and "French" were positive rallying points for
separatism, then Queen Elizabeth's visit to Canada and the English
Canadians posed a negative Social object— scapegoat.

The Queen's

visit served as an .opportunity for the Separatist to protest a
perceived colonial symbol and express a general discontent for English
Canadiansj
as the idol.

sis a negative rallying point, it served the same purpose
As social objects, they both serve as rallying points

for common sentiments.
The French-Canadian's self-image as a colonized minority
made the liberation movements in Africa and Asia another point of
reference for the separatist movement.
French-Canadians are thus now the senior national minority in the
western world; perhaps, instead of being proud of that position,
they are wounded to think that minorities - younger, poorer,
less educated and cultivated than they - have achieved a
national status which they, the French-Canadians, have never
really sought in large number and with continued determination
(Hughes, I963* xiv).
Pierre Bouzgault, a conservative separatist, stated Quebec's identity
with colonialism as, "There are similarities of mentality between
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French-Canada and the inhabitants of all colonial countries.

The

French-Canadian is not the destitute and exploited chattel of
classical colonialism, but intellectually and psychologically he
does share a common bond with him" (Quoted in Jones, 196?* 19)•
French-Canadian separatism emerged as a consequence of the
incongruence between urbanization and the French-Canadian traditional
value system.

This condition was fed by collective definitions and

responses to subsequent events and situations that culminated in
crystallizing Separatism into a social movement.

CHAPTER IV

SEPARATIST ORGANIZATIONS

The efforts of Lesage and his Liberal party in the early
I960 *s to propel the French-Canadians into the urbanized, commercial
ized, and industrialized world did not come fast enough and in
sufficient amount to curb rising separatist sentiments.

Out of

Lesage*s "Quiet Revolution" numerous organizations with separatist
"ideals" appeared in the form of socialist-reform, nationalist, ad
hoc, and hard core permanent organizations.
(l972t

Conflict Studies

lists twenty-five organizations either associated with or

identified as separatist organizations.

Some of the separatist

organizations, like the Front de Liberation du Quebec and Railiement
National, were well known and strong in participant-follower support.
Others were no more than criminal gangs operating under the cover of
the separatist emotions.

In 1968 a political separatist party,

Parti Quebecois, emerged as the "official" voice of separatism for
the French-Canadians.
In this chapter the Parti Quebecois and the Front de Liberation
du Quebec (FLQ) will be examined in terms of their impact on the
separatist movement.

The events and circumstances that sent the FLQ

on its 1970 reign of terror will be highlighted., The effectiveness
of the FLQ's organizational structure will be compared with the
criteria for internal structure of core groups set forth by Lang
kZ

and Lang (1961).

An appraisal will be made of the consequences of

the FLQ's strategy and tactics.

Parti Quebecois

The issues surrounding the emergence of the Parti Quebecois
were similar in nature to those that involved the French and EnglishCanadians in the Manitoba and Ontario school issue at the turn of
the century.

The 1969 issue started when a bill was presented to the

Canadian parliament to promote the use of the French language in
Quebec.

Because of the French-Canadian reaction to the bill, it was

withdrawn, but reintroduced the following year and subsequently
passed (Dion and Seve, 197*** 12&-144).*

This action, as was the

previous school controversy (school issue 1895**1900)* was interpreted
by the French-Canadians, especially the separatists, as another case
of the Canadian government putting English-Canadiah interests before
the interests and rights of the French-Canadian citizens of Quebec
(Dion and Seve, 197*0 •
the Parti Quebecois.

This event was the key to the emergence of

Based on the separatist definition of the

intent of the federal government concerning the education bill, the
separatist organizations "Mouvement Souverainete-Association" and
"Ralliement National" merged to form the Parti Quebecois.

Later,

October 1968, another separatist political party, "Rassemblement pour
1 *Independence Nationale" (RIN) joined the Parti Quebecois.
The formation of a legally recognized political party which
represents a social, movement for the secession of a territory (Quebec)
and its people (French-Canadians) is an unusual aspect of social

■kk
movements.

It appears that a drive for political recognition at

this stage came prematurely.

If the formation of a legal, organization,

Parti Quebecois, were applied to Hopper's (1950* 270-279) frame of
reference for the study of revolutionary movements, it would fall
in the final stage, the "Institutional stage."

This stage exists,

according to Hopper,
When the attitudes and values of the revolutionary leadership
have thus become the legal and political foundation of social
organization, a new society has been formed and the revolution
has been consummated.
At this time, 1968, the separatist movement did not have clear, strong
and definitive leadership.

The revolutionary groups, the FLQ and

the like, certainly were not blessed with dynamic and available
leadership.

The popular leadership of the FI^ during this time,

Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon, were serving life sentences in
the Montreal prison f or murder in connection with the bombing of
the La Grenade Shoe Factory.

Rene Levesque was a popular political

figure before he organized the Parti Quebecois, but as a political
leader he was untried.

A "society" existed, but it had not settled

on how independence would be accomplished..

Generally the revolu

tionary groups advocated the overthrow of capitalism and imperialism
and the decolonization of Quebec.

The Parti Quebecois was organized

to seek independence for Quebec through the electoral system.
Without identifying a specific stage of development, the
Langs (1961* 505) refer to the merger of groups in general.

"Any

core group, If it is to be successful, must be able to link up with
other groups pursuing similar objectives."

This is what happened in
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the formation of Parti Quebecois, but the particular form it took
is the unusual aspect of its emergence.
Had the Parti Quebecois been able to gain and maintain more
control over the FLQ, the October 1970 crisis might never have
occurred and subsequent provincial elections might have been more
favorable to the Parti Quebecois•
The circumstances and events surrounding the provincial
general election of April 1970 caused the unrest and discontent
that was to a large extent responsible for the October 1970 crisis—
the kidnappings of the British diplomat James Cross and the Liberal
cabinet minister Pierre Laporte.

In that election the Parti

Quebecois should have constituted the official opposition since it
received 23*7 percent of the popular vote, but it won only seven out
of one hundred eight seats (Saywell, 1971* 5*27).

The separatist

reaction to the election results is a prime example of the operation
of the Langs (1961) collective process, demoralization.

The separatist,

supporting the democratic way to independence lost faith and trust in
the official system as a means to achieve their objective.
became demoralized.

They

(Data are not available on the number of Parti

Quebecois supporters who turned to revolutionary means as a result
of the election and related events).
The basis for the separatist cry of injustice concerns the
lack of assembly seats acquired compared to the percentage of the
total vote for the Parti Quebecois.

The Union Nationals party won

seventeen assembly seats with 19.6 percent of the total vote* the
Ralliement Crediste party won twelve assembly seats with 11.1 percent

46
of the total vote; hut the Parti Quebecois won only seven assembly
seats with 23.7 percent of the total vote (Saywell, 1971).

Seats

Political Party

Percentage of
Total Vote

72

41.8

Parti Quebecois

7

23.7

Union Nationale

17

19.6

Ralliement Crediste

12

11.1

0

4.5

Liberals

Others

This discrepancy between the percentage of total votes and
the number of seats it actually won was accounted for by the electoral
system, a uninominal single-ballot voting system, and a uniform dis
tribution of the separatist vote across the province (Saywell, 1971).
This explanation did not convince the Parti Quebecois militants, who
had worked enthusiastically during the election campaign for the
"democratic solution" to separatism, that the outcome was not the
work of the English-Canadians (Saywell, 1971)*

The "coupe de la

brinks" was a scare tactic used by the English-Canadians to frighten
potential Pnrti Quebicois supporters and to discredit the party and
separatism.

A pre-election poll showed the Parti Quebecois posed a

threat to the Liberal party.

The rumor was circulated that stocks,

bonds, bills, securities, etc., should be removed from Quebec because
in the event of a separatist victory the Parti Quebecois would
nationalize all foreign capital.

A few days before the election a
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convoy of armored Brinks trucks -publicly paraded through Montreal to
Ontario (Saywell, 1971)*

The significance of this event is in the

definitions formed after the election when the separatists related
their defeat in the election to this and other English-Canadian
connected events.

Saywell (1971) describes an incident which was

a forecast of trouble*
Commenting on the Brinks affair and the joyful reactions in
Montreal's English dailies, Mr. Parizeau warned that "these
people are just waving a red flag in front of a fuming
bull...they are really asking for trouble." Not only were
the internal tensions made more acute, but the election
results led many to question the democratic or representative
system. As Parizeau exclaimed* "God help us...You see it is
not my defeat nor that of Rene Levesque that is important.. •
It's the defeat of our arguments in favor of the parliamentary
system."
As a result of the April 1970 (described by Bernard Smith as "Le
Coup d*Etat du Avril 29") the Parti Quebecois lost what little
influence it had had over the FLQ and thus the FLQ was free to
carry out its reign of terror during the fall of 1970.

In their

Manifesto, the FLQ cite their impatience and the "Liberal victory
proves that that which is called democracy in Quebec is and always
has been the *democracy' of the rich" (FLQ Manifesto printed in
Le Devoir, 13 October 1970, quoted in Dion and Seve, 197*0 as the
causes of their revolutionary (violence and terrorism) behavior.

Front de Liberation du Quebec

The Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) came into exist
ence in late 1962, aftd its activities date from the beginning of 1963
(Vallieres, 1971)*

The FLQ's founder was Georges Schoeters, a
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Belgian, •who immigrated to Canada in 1951*

A strong admirer of ,

Fidel Castro, Schoeters visited Cuba in 1959 and I960.

He was soon

drawn to the cause of French-Canadian separatism, and, believing
that revolutions always bring solutions, he established the FLQ#

Organization
The FLQ was organized into independent 3 to 6 man cells
loosely controlled by a central executive committee believed based
in Montreal#

At one time or another, there were bombing, financial

(robbery), propaganda, intelligence, and possibly assassination
cells; however, a financial cell, for example, was not prohibited
from carrying out a bombing (Pickering, 1970)#

For security pur

poses, a cell leader often did not know his men*s true identities,
and he rarely knew more than one member of another cell; no member
ship cards were issued and no membership rosters were drawn up
(MacDonald, 1972; 234-235)*

In describing the FLQ as "loosely

controlled," the emphasis is on the first word rather than the
second#

A Canadian Army report claims that a central executive

committee issued coded messages in communiques sent to and broad
cast by the commercial news media (Pickering, 1970)#

For all intents

and purposes, however, each cell was autonomous and called its own
shots#

Journalist Tom Buckley of The New York Times Magazine (1970;

December 6) described the FLQ as "a grouping# ••so loose that it
hardly deserve(d) the name of an organization."
An article by the US News and World Report (197Q* November 2)
estimated the FLQ's strength at approximately 150 active members

supported by perhaps 2000 sympathizers.

The majority were students,

laborers, and "street people"; most were in their late teens or
early twenties.

There is some dispute over the social background of

the FLQ*s members.

Moss (1972* 115) states that "a significant pro

portion of the young men who made their way into the ranks of the
FLQ were from the slums and shanty-towns of Montreal."

Whereas

Clark (1965* 16-17) says that "almost all (of the FI£*s members)
were from good, respectable families of at least middle-income level.
According to interviews (Notes, 1972) most of the members were from
middle class families; however, there were a few of the types
mentioned by Moss.

Strategy and Tactics
The FLQ*s goal was an independent French-speaking Quebec,
set up as a radical-socialist state; violence was to be the means to
this end.

In it's first communique, issued in early 1963$ the FLQ

announced that its mission was "to completely destroy, by systematic
sabotage, all.the symbols of colonial (primarily English-speaking)
institutions" (Time. 1963* June 14).
The communique also stated that the FLQ "suicide commandos"
would sabotage government buildings, English-language newspaper
offices, barracks, and businesses that practiced "cultural discrimina
tion" (Moss, 1972* 121).

Terrorist activities included bombings,

armed robberies, and arms thefts, hitting such targets as military
recruiting offices, banks, armories, gun shops, a radio/television
tower, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police building, an oil refinery,
and numerous mailboxes (Pickering, 1971)*

One FLQ financing cell
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carried out seven robberies in six months* netting $40,000 in cash
and $45,000 worth of guns and radio equipment before police caught
all six cell members (MacDonald, 1972: 234)#

The FLQ concentrated

its actions in Montreal, Quebec's largest city, with a population
of well over 2,000,000.

Internal Problems of the FLQ.
In spite of limited "success” in some areas, the FLQ
suffered from structural problems.

If a movement is to survive, it

must deal with and overcome structural problems (Lang and Lang, 1961i
531-532)•

A major structural problem identified by the Langs is

"regularizing the relations between leaders and followers."
The FLQ apparently experienced a lack of disciplined and
dedicated members.

For example, the police were able to exploit

FLQ defections and internal quarrels (Mallory, 1972: 210).

Moreover,

very few of those FLQ members who were captured and convicted
returned to the movement after their release from prison (Conflict
Studies,‘1972: 10).

It is perhaps this fact which led Canadian

university professor Denis Smith (1971: 70) to remark that the FLQ
seemed "to lack any permanent core of leaders.”

In addition, one

source has noted that most of the money which was stolen was "spent
on high-living," (Gonflict Studies, 1972: 10), again suggesting a
lack of discipline and dedication.

Another major structural problem

identified by the Langs (1961) is "coordinating the relations among
various groups within the movement."
The FLQ's cellular organization enhanced security but not
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coordination.

For example, most police attempts to infiltrate the

organization failed.

(One reason for these failures was that a

candidate for membership in a cell was required to participate in
some crime as a sign of his good faith.)

However, the FLQ was rarely

able to mount a coordinated attack involving more than one cell.
Moreover, the extreme secrecy existing within each cell and between
cells severely limited the transmission of information in a timely
manner.

An organization whose cell members often do not know each

other's true identities, whose cell leaders know at most only one
member of another cell, and whose central leadership (according to
the Canadian Army) depends upon the commercial news media to pass
messages, is hardly conducive to the rapid passing of critical infor
mation.

For example, timely warnings of police actions, in progress

or impending, evidently often failed to reach the FLQ members con
cerned, since time and time again the police were able to round up
entire cells (Pickering, 1971).
The October 1970 crisis is another example of an FLQ internal
organization problem.

On Monday morning, October 5» 1970, four

members of an FLQ cell kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James
R. Cross from his Montreal home.
Pierre Laporte was kidnapped on October 10 by another cell,
the "Chenier” finance cell (named after a French-Canadian doctor
killed in the 1837 anti-British uprising).

This action is a good

example of the FLQ's lack of coordination and control, and lack of
discipline within the group.

The members of the Chenier cell were

driving near Dallas, Texas, when they learned over the radio of the
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Cross kidnapping.

They felt that Cross was a poor choice of victim,

so they returned to,Canada to plan the kidnapping of a more
"appropriate" victim*

There is no indication whatsoever that the

Chenier cell received any instructions from a central executive
committee or any other outside source to kidnap Laporte*

Thus,

the Chenier cell carried out a second FLQ kidnapping on its own
because it disagreed with another FLQ cell's choice of victim (Pickering,
1971).
Popular Support
Shortly after the FLQ was formed Marcel Chaput, a leading
separatist politician, publicly speculated that English-Canadian
agents provocateurs had founded the FLQ in order to discredit the
separatist movement (Moss, 1972* -116).

In spite of the opposition of

a number of separatist political leaders, however, the FLQ had,
according to Newsweek magazine (1970, October 26), "won at least
qualified sympathy from many ordinary French-Canadians" by the fall
of 1970*

It is certainly possible, perhaps even probable, that a

number of French-Canadian separatists sympathized with the FLQ \s
ends, but not its means*

Furthermore, those who would never take

part in or support violence themselves may nonetheless enjoy seeing
institutions they regard as oppressive being successfully attacked*
In regard to the mobilization of support, the FLQ enjoyed
its greatest successes in two areas*

First, the FLQ managed to

infiltrate several organizations, including the Company of Young
Canadians (CYC), a federally sponsored organization*

Police
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investigations later revealed that one FLQ member had become cochairman of the CYC, and that other CYC (actually FLQ) members had
managed to divert CYC funds, reproducing machines, and cars for
FLQ purposes, including the distribution of FLQ newspapers (Conflict
Studies, 1972).

Weapons and subversive literature were also seized

in the homes of CYC (FLQ) members (Pickering, 1971)*

The FLQ also

managed to infiltrate the Front d' Act ion Politique (FRAP), a group
which.provided candidates in the 1970 Montreal civic elections; one FRAP
candidate who ran for office was in fact a member of the FLQ (Conflict
Studies, 1972).

Other organizations which the FLQ managed to pene

trate and to radicalize to one degree or another included the National
Confederation of Trade Unions and various student associations.
The second area where the FLQ enjoyed some success was in
organizing mass demonstrations.

The FLQ was rarely able to generate

a mass demonstration solely in support of itself; in Other words,
the FLQ on its own— not hidden behind a front— was unable to get the
people into the streets.

However, the FLQ was able to incite and

encourage, and at times organize and give some direction to, demonstra
tions by such groups as dissatisfied students and striking workers
and taxi-drivers.

It was found., for example, that at least twenty

CYC members (actually FLQ adherents) had led violent demonstrations
at one time or another. t During 1969» 100 demonstrations were held in
Montreal alone— many of them inspired by the FLQ (Pickering, 1971)*
Reaction
The FLQ had hoped that its kidnappings and acts of violence

would force the government into overreacting, into taking extreme
measures that would alienate the French-Canadian populace and drive
it into the active separatist camp*

While the bombings, robberies,

and kidnappings did generate publicity for the group, most likely
enhanced the FLQ's morale, and perhaps pleased some separatist

,

sympathizers, the terrorist acts also frightened and angered many
of Quebec's citizens, both French-Canadian and English-Canadian.,
For one thing, none of the bomb victims, including a 65~year-old
night watchman and a 64-year-old secretary, could have been considered
by any stretch of the imagination "an exploiter of the working
masses” ; moreover, some of the victims were French-Canadians
(Newsweek. 1963)# May 61 58)*

In fact, the FLQ's chief bomb maker

quit in 1966 because he "became disillusioned at the slaughter of
innocent victims;"

this was a major reason that 1967 was singularly

free of violence (Riseborough, 1975* 17-25)*

During the period

1963-1970, however, the FLQ conducted more than 200 bombings in
Quebec alone; overall, the terrorists averaged one bomb planted
every ten days in the seven years they were active (Conflict Studies,
1972).
The addition of kidnapping to the FLQ*s reign of terror
certainly did not increase the Quebec populace's feeling of safety.
The FLQ had hoped to get the people into the streets; instead, it
scared many Quebeckers off the streets.

One Quebec French-Canadian

remarked, "The FLQ makes me afraid to walk the streets of my own city.
That is the meaning of terrorism." (MacDonald, 1972* 224).

During

the crisis period, Montreal theaters and restaurants had very few
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customers, a result hardly conducive to generating support for the
FLQ from those French-Canadians who depended upon these businesses
for their livelihoods (Buckley, 1970i 150).

A number of French-

Canadians actually felt relieved when federal troops arrived to
assist the police and the War Measures Act was placed in effect.

As

Buckley (1970; 15°) remarked, "unmistakably • • . the Quebec public
feared the bombing and kidnapping of the front (the FLQ) more than
it did the possibility of abuse of police power."

CHAPTER V

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

The Emergence of the Movement

According to the Langs* (1961) definition of social movements,
French-Canadian separatism meets the criteria for a social movement.
Separatism is widespread and large-scale, it concerns the province
of Quebec which includes approximately six million people.

It

involves continuing collective action in pursuit of a specific
objective that shapes the social order.

Separatist goals seek

independence for Quebec that would give it nationhood status, complete
sovereignty.

Conditions and Social Change
The separatist movement emerged out of social conditions that
were created and exposed by social change.
cause social movements.

Social conditions do not

They provide the social backdrop for unrest

and give the movement its unique character and flavor. ^The FrenchCanadian culture and social structure provide conditions for the
separatist movement.

Quebec's school system was dominated by the

Roman Catholic Church that emphasized an education in the classics
and professions.

Ibis type of training provided the French-Canadian

with a respectable education and served to perpetuate French-Canadian
culture.

However, the French-Canadian traditional education failed
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to prepare the French-Canadian to compete with his English-Canadian
counterpart in Quebec's economic system.

The traditional education

was not seriously questioned until French-Canada began to feel the
impact of industrialization and realized the inferior position of
the French-Canadian in Quebec's economic system^/ The FrenchCanadian society, led by the Church, was primarily concerned with
preserving its way of life as indicated by the popular nationalist
phrase, "Notre maitre, le passe" ("Our master, the past").
French-Canadian nationalist goal is ethnic survival.

The

As long as the

French-Canadian social institutions were protected from assimilation
by a dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, their nationalist aspirations were
being fulfilled.
r

The French-Canadian's lack of interest and participation in

\

'

'

Quebec's economyjdates back to the events surrounding the British
conquest.

The English-Canadians took charge of Canada's commercial

enterprises through acquiescence and default by the French.

Therefore,

when (^ig business and industry came to Quebec they were usually owned
and managed by English-Canadians or controlled by English-Canadian
and United States investors.)
Urbanization and industrialization created a new middle class
in Quebec, especially in the Montreal area.

The new middle class

received a nan-traditional education, urban living weakened their
traditional "rural spirit," and |their working environment placed them
in contact with the English-Canadian which prpvided an opportunity
for comparing social-economic status.^ The new middle class, without
the involvement of the Church in its traditional role as mediator
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between the government and the individual# was able to look directly
at Duplessis's government as the source of the French-Canadian's
social ills.
These conditions created a state of social unrest.

The

combination of these conditions served to break down traditional
behavior patterns and prepared the individuals, and especially the
new middle class, for changed definitions of the situation.

Social

change is the most important aspect, at this point, of the process
of an emerging social movement.

Social change creates the conditions

for social unrest and prepares the individuals or groups for collec
tive responses.

However, social unrest does not necessarily lead

to large scale or visible collective responses; it may just dissipate
without any consequences.
excellent example of this.

The World War I conscription crisis is an
Even though the conscription crisis

involved visible behavior such as rioting and disorder, this behavior
was not transformed into large-scale discontent nor was the behavior
continuing •
Events and the Collective Processes
Social, unrest is transformed into discontent and collective
responses by leaders, who provide new definitions of the situation,
and events which provide new situations requiring new definitions
and collective responses.

An agitator or charismatic leader is the

most effective type of leader to identify social causes that condition
individuals and groups to redefine their traditional values and
respond collectively.

The timing and nature of an event are the
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critical aspects conducive to the formation of new definitions and
the transformation of behavior into collective responses* [ The force
of significant events played an important and necessary role in the
emergence of the separatist movement*J (Th e death of Duplessis) was
seen by the new middle class as a new gained freedomf a release from
an oppressor# which caused them to redefine many of their traditional
values*

His death also paused the new middle class to shift their

attention to English-Canadian and foreign investors as the oppressors
)
of the French-Canadians )and the ‘’villains” (of the movement //The
de Gaulle visit^ although short-lived as a rallying point, provided a
model for the ’’French” and gave separatism international publicity^
The emerging African and Asian nations provided examples of anti
colonial and independence movements.

The FLQ did not have a large

following, but its revolutionary tactics kept the notion of separatism
in the forefront as a constant reminder to the French-Canadian of
his social ills. ^The crises during 1970 (the election and the kid
nappings) required new and critical definitions to be made concerning
the separatist movement*

These events, spontaneous and long-term,

provided situations requiring definitions that questioned the tradi
tional value system. ))
Social movements emerge out of discontent for conditions
created by social change.

Social change can explain the conditions

but the collective processes that break down traditional behavior
patterns and bring about changed definitions of the situation that
lead to collective responses and the emergence of social movements
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are within the domain of collective behavior.

Why It Failed

The following assessment of the separatist movement deals
with the significant aspects of the movement which contributed to
its failure to gain and maintain momentum during the 1970*s.
Leadership
What little leadership the movement had failed to support
the, separatist cause during a very critical phase of the movement
(the 1970 crises, the election and the October kidnappings).

Rene

Levesque, the leader of the Parti Quebecois, was a strong political
leader, but he was not a "true believer."

His commitment to demo

cratic means limited his alternatives, thus hampering his flexibility
to act in the best interest of the movement after the separatists
lost at the election polls.
extreme.

The FLQ leadership represented the other

It consisted of terrorist leaders who were able to attract

only an insignificant following.

Their concentration on one particu

lar form of strategy and tactics made the organization an "underground
affair."
The man who came close to the role of a "true believer" was
Marcel Ghaput.

He drew attention with his book, Pourquois ,1e Suis

Separatiste, and his fasting episodes to raise money for the
separatist cause.

He made an unsuccessful attempt at provincial

politics since he dropped the separatist cause as an active pursuit.
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Ideology and Strategy
The separatist movement lacked mass support.

The primary

cause of this was due to the various separatist organizations that
were demanding the French-Canadian#s allegiance.

Except for a

common goal, separatism, the goals and ideology of the organization
9

ran the entire spectrum of political extremes.

The only effort

towards uniting was the formation of the Parti Quebecois (see
Chapter IV).

Divergent ideologies and philosophies failed to present

a clear course of action required to solicit a mass following.
Therefore, when separatist feelings reached their apex in the late
1960's and during the April 1970 provincial elections, a united
front for separatism could not be achieved.

The Parti Quebecois*

failure to acquire sufficient National Assembly seats as a result of
the election disillusioned the previously democratically oriented
following and caused a temporary return to the support of street
violence as a means of achieving its goals.

The philosophy, ideology,

and strategy of the separatist organizations fit into two general
categories— the democratic route to Quebec independence, the Parti
Quebecois, and the authoritarian approach.through terrorist and
guerrilla organizations like the FLQ.

These two opposite forms are

similar in concept to the Langs* (I96I 1 I87-I89) description of the
formation of the "gang" and the "sect" out of sectarian associations
which could apply in this case to account for the opposite directions
taken by the Parti Quebecois and organizations like the FLQ.
•••the radical break on the part of the sectarian takes many
forms. These may crystallize in two generally opposite
directions. One culminates in the formation of a "gang"; the
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other in the "sect/’
•••the interests of the gang are not only worldly but con
cerned with the here and now. The gang has no futuristic
illusions and, in fact* often avoids concern with anything
but the immediate present;,,.
As far as gang formation is concerned, vague dissatisfactions
on the part of its members coalesce into a code of active
warfare against official norms.
In this case, the "gang" represents the terrorist and guerrilla
organizations and the Parti Quebecois represents the form of the
"sect,"

The characteristics of the gang match.the activities of the

FLQ described in Chapter IV.

Their operations are planned against

the norms of society, especially against anything connected with the
English-Canadians and foreign interests.
The protest of the religious sect is against prevailing in
stitutions as corruptions of a divine order. The sectarian
code seeks to substitute positive rigor where laxness and
compromise are the custom (Lang and Lang, I96I 1 188-189)*
Whereas, in the case of the Parti Quebecois, political
could be substituted for religious in reference to sect, the charac
teristics of the sect would apply to the Parti Quebecois.

The Parti

Quebecois* fight is against the controlling interest the EnglishCanadians and foreigners have in Quebec's economic institution.

The

protest of the Parti Quebecois is against the English-Canadians as
corrupters of the French-Canadian way of life.

The French-Canadian Perspective
To understand the loss of momentum experienced by the
separatist movement, it is necessary to put into perspective the
events that created the enthusiasm for separatism and the events
that brought about its sudden decline.
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During the deca.de of the 1960's, French-Ganadian separatists
perceived FLQ tactics as being in the name of the French-Canadians.
The work of the FLQ was being gradually accepted as a means of
eliminating foreign control of Quebec's economy and a means of
expressing French-Canadian discontent for English-Canadian domination.
As long as the English-Canadians and foreign interests were the
targets, no serious demonstrations were made against the FLQ's
tactics.

This was the situation when de Gaulle visited Quebec in

1967.
Separatism received a boon from de Gaulle's visit to Quebec
in 1967, a significant event that caused the French-Canadians to
crystallize their definitions concerning the separatist movement.
De Gaulle was an idol to the French separatist.

De Gaulle, the repre

sentative of "French," visited Quebec— not Canada— and through words
and actions, "blessed" the separatist movement.

Not only did this

event signify a tremendous rallying point for the movement, but(it
forced the separatist issue to the front burner and into the inter
national political arena.

It forced Canada's and Quebec's political

leaders to show their hand and to take a stand on separatism.

The

significance of events in determining responses to a social, movement
is stated by the Langs (I96I 1 51*0*
A social movement is carried by the amount of enthusiasm
and support it attracts among a wider public. Support for
its objective depends on many specific and unique circum
stances and not just on broad social changes. Specific
events shape the collective definition of a movement.
The enthusiasm created by de Gaulle's visit did not last
long.

After an unsuccessful attempt for a separatist victory through

the democratic process (the defeat of the Parti Quebecois in the
April 1970 elections), the discontent turned to a more violent form
that culminated in the kidnappings of LaPorte and Cross in October
1970*

Just as the de Gaulle event generated enthusiasm for

separatism, the October 1970 events generated a "shock effect" that
cancelled out support and mitigated enthusiasm for the movement.
Both of these events brought about a collective definition of the
situation, the difference being they were on opposite ends of the
spectrum*. The October crises brought about a decline in support
for the violent methods of the FLQ.

The Parti Quebecois lost support

because immediately after the October crises any form of separatism
meant an approval of violence and terrorism.
Implications of This Study

Since the 1970 crises, the separatist movement has been
dormant.

During the 1960's, the separatist movement had all the

characteristics of a dynamic social movement.

However, during 1970,

the movement failed to gain the momentum necessary to realize its
objective because of two key aspects:

the French-Canadian*s rejection

of the violence by the separatist revolutionary groups (a common
reaction of -a democratic society); and a signifleant lack of opposi
tion to separatist demands from the Canadian government and the EnglishCanadians.

This study indicates that the separatist movement w 5 H

re-emerge with its main effort directed at achieving French-Canadian
independence through the separatist legitimate political party, Parti

Quebecois, rather than through the separatist revolutionary groups.
The re-emergence of the separatist movement will be brought
on by a critical event or events similar in nature to the events
that were significant to the emergence of the movement during the
I960*s.

An event with the potential of giving rise to the separatist

issue is the proposed revision of the Canadian constitution.

This

act would provide the opportunity for Quebec to cause its political
status within the confederation to be modified or gain complete
sovereignty.

However, the driving force that will cause future

events to be a significant happening for the separatist movement
and keep the movement going will be a growing anti-French backlash
(the necessary opposition that was absent during the earlier phase
of the movement)•
A growing anti-French backlash will give separatism the
necessary opposition to bring about the degree of conflict that
could thrust the movement into a type of revolutionary warfare.
However, a full blown revolutionary movement in Quebec appears to be
highly unlikely.

This is based on the* key role violence played in

the previous failure of the movement, and the separatists' desire
to preserve the present governmental structure and not to destroy
it by a revolution.

However, short-termed violence, normally associ

ated with elementary collective behavior, will be present in a
"nonviolent" separatist movement as it is in all social movements.
The most likely course for separatism is that it will reemerge as a social movement.

It is possible that separatism may
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remain in its present "status quo" existence as long as the
Canadian government continues to acquiesce to Quebec's demands for
more autonomy in provincial affairs.

However, in face of a growing

anti-French backlash, the status quo alternative for separatism
appears to be a very remote possibility*
A logical consequence of this new form of opposition
(anti-French backlash) is that it will force both the English and
French-Canadians to pursue the separatist issue to its conclusion*
This may cause Canada to grant Quebec independence with an associate
status within the confederation.

The probable forces behind Canada's

decision are: the potential for violence present in the separatist
\
movement; efforts by both the English and French-Canadians to avoid
violence; and the desire of most of the separatist leaders to main
tain a degree of social and economic ties with the rest of Canada
after its independence.

An associate status will give Quebec

political independence, a common currency with Canada, and an
economic status similar to a type of "common market" with Canada end
the United States.
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